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 Abstract 
The EU is a structure which is positioned “in-between” hierarchically organized 
nation-state governing structures and heterarchically structured global governance 
structures. Thus, the EU is a hybrid which partly relies on governing and partly on 
governance. This two-dimensionality is the central reason why the question of the 
constitutional character of the EU remains fundamentally unresolved. Thus, it is 
proposed that the EU should aim for the development of a constitutional form 
aimed at alleviating the tensions inherent in the European construction through a 
conflict of laws approach. In order to respect the hybridity of the Union, such an 
approach will however have to be based on a three-dimensional conflict of laws 
concept insofar as it would have to take account of horizontal conflicts between 
territorial units, vertical conflicts between the EU and its member states as well as 
horizontal conflicts between the functionally differentiated structures of the wider 
society. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU)1 operates “in-between” its member states (MS) and 
global trans-national structures.2 Thus, the EU’s legal order is neither charac-
terized by hierarchy in the nation-state sense nor is it characterized by the kind 
of radical heterarchy which is a key feature of global legal structures.3 Rather 
the EU is a hybrid which combines hierarchy and heterarchy in a particular 
manner. This hybridity is also apparent in the organizational form of the EU. 
The EU is an organizational conglomerate which consists of an entire range of 
institutional structures. From an overall perspective, the EU can nonetheless be 
understood as resting on a two-dimensional organizational structure in the 
sense that it, on the one hand, contains a hierarchical governing dimension, 
consisting of the triangular relationship between the Council of the European 
Union (the Council), the Commission of the European Communities (the 
Commission) and the European Parliament (EP) and a heterarchical dimension 
consisting of a multitude of governance structures (GS), such as the Open 
Method of Co-ordination (OMC)4, Comitology5 and (regulatory) agencies.6 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated the term ‘European Union’ (EU) refers to the EU as well 
as its predecessors in the form of the European Communities (EC), the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and 
Euratom. 
2 For further elaboration on the EU’s relations to the “wider world“ see; Poul F. Kjaer: 
The Societal Function of European Integration in the Context of World Society’, Sozi-
ale Systeme. Zeitschrift für Soziologische Theorie, pp. 367-378, Vol. 13, Heft 1 + 2, 
2007. 
3 For the heterarchy of global law see Andreas Fischer-Lescano/Gunther Teubner: Re-
gime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global 
Law, Michigan Journal of International Law, 25, 2004, 999-1046; Andreas Fischer-
Lescano/Gunther Teubner: Regime-Kollisionen: Zur Fragmentierung des Weltrechts 
(Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 2006). 
4 The OMC was officially launched in 2000 within the realm of the so-called Lisbon 
process as a mode aimed at ensuring systematic mutual observation between MS 
through benchmarking and systematic comparisons. De facto this “new” mode is ho-
wever to a large extent only formalising already existing informal structures of mutual 
observation, which has existed since the beginning of the integration process. See also 
Poul F. Kjaer: Formalization or De-Formalization through Governance? in: Rainer 
Nickel (Ed.): Conflict of Laws or Laws of Conflict. ARENA Report Series, Oslo, 
2009 (forthcoming). For an overview of the different forms of OMC processes see Su-
sana Borrás/Kerstin Jacobsson: ‘The open method of co-ordination and new gover-
nance patterns in the EU’, pp. 185-208, Journal of European Public Policy, 11, 2, 
2004, p. 193-94. 
5 Comitology dates back to the beginning of the 1960s. In a narrow sense comitology 
committees only deal with the implementation of Community legislation. Different 
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The first dimension constitutes the political system of the EU. The latter di-
mension, on the other hand, represents forms through which the political sys-
tem of the EU ensures its embeddedness in its environment.7 This dimension 
therefore reflects the functionally differentiated basic structures (Tiefenstruk-
turen) of the wider society just as it is directly aimed at overcoming the dis-
tinction between the public and the private spheres of society.8 Accordingly, it 
can be argued that the distinction between governing and governance consti-
tutes the central distinction (Leitdifferenz) on which the EU is founded, in the 
sense that this distinction represents a functional equivalent of the “old-
European” (alteuropäische) state/society distinction originally introduced by 
Hegel. 
The question how to describe the EU’s constitutional form must therefore 
be transformed into the question of how the relationship between the govern-
ing and the governance dimensions, as well as how the relations between the 
different forms of GS is being constitutionalized? The argument presented here 
is that this question can only be answered through the development of a third 
category of constitutionalism which extends beyond traditional nation-state 
constitutionalism whilst taking into consideration the differences between the 
                                                                                                                                                      
committees exist for the preparation and negotiation of legislation. Hence, the exact 
number of comitology committees remains disputed. Estimations differ from 300 to 
around 1000 committees depending on the criteria’s used. The committees consist of 
Commission officials, MS officials and – to a lesser extent – private actors. For an o-
verview see Georg Haibach: ‘The History of Comitology’, pp. 185-215 in: M. Ande-
nas/A.Türk (Eds.): Delegated Legislation and the Role of Committees in the EC (The 
Hague, Kluwer, 2000). 
6 The first two agencies were established in the 1970s. From the mid 1990s the number 
of agencies has however expanded rapidly. Currently 32 agencies exist and several 
more has been planned. Although the agencies in an organizational sense have a hier-
archical nucleus, a common feature is however that they mainly serve as coordinators 
and secretariats of heterarchical networks which are occupied with the gathering, 
processing and re-dissemination of information. For an overview see Poul F. Kjaer: 
Between Governing and Governance. On the Emergence, Function and Form of 
Europe’s Post-national Constellation, European University Institute (2008), available 
at http://hdl.handle.net/1814/9067, p. 96. 
7 To the three main forms of governance structures mentioned above one could also add 
mutual recognition, the partnership concept, originally developed within the context of 
Community structural founding, the so-called social dialogue as developed under the 
framework of the Maastricht Treaty, and the concept of Environmental Policy Integra-
tion. See Joanne Scott/David M. Trubek: ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to 
Governance in the European Union’, European Law Journal, pp. 1-18, 8, 1, 2002. 
8 Poul F. Kjaer: Embeddedness through Networks – a Critical appraisal of the Network 
Concept in the Oeuvre of Karl-Heinz Ladeur, German Law Journal (forthcoming, 
2009). 
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EU and the kind of radically functionally differentiated and heterarchical 
global structures described by Fischer-Lescano and Teubner.9 Accordingly, it 
is suggested that a coherent concept for the description of how legal conflicts 
in the European context are being stabilized should be based on a three-
dimensional concept of conflict of laws capable of describing horizontal con-
flicts between territorially delineated entities in the form of states, vertical con-
flicts between the EU and its MS, as well as horizontal conflicts between the 
functionally differentiated basic structures of the wider society. In relation to 
the latter dimension, which is concerned specifically with GS, it is moreover 
suggested that a constitutional principle of functional separation, more exten-
sive than the classical concept of a functional separation of powers, could pro-
vide a basis for legal stabilization of norm production. 
2. The Transformation of Constitutionalism 
Although the MS provide substantial limitations to its level of self-
determination, the EU must be understood as an autonomous social structure 
which possesses the freedom to select between various possible operations. 
The autonomy is also expressed in the understanding that the EU’s legal order 
is converging with the legal orders of the MS but nonetheless remains a sepa-
rate and independent legal order.10 The autonomy implies that the EU needs to 
justify its selections.11 Firstly, this is the case because all autonomous social 
structures are faced with a continual demand to ensure their own coherency 
through the reproduction of narratives that connect their selection of specific 
operations with their overall structure. But in addition, autonomous social 
structures are reflexive to the extent that they are conscious that they fulfill 
specific functions towards society as a whole, as well as towards other partial 
social structures.12 Hence, they are continuously faced with the demand to 
                                                 
9 Andreas Fischer-Lescano/Gunther Teubner: Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for 
Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, Michigan Journal of International 
Law, 25, 2004, 999-1046; Andreas Fischer-Lescano/Gunther Teubner: Regime-
Kollisionen: Zur Fragmentierung des Weltrechts (Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 2006). 
10 Marc Amstutz: ‘In Between Worlds: Marleasing and the Emergence of Interlegality in 
Legal Reasoning’, European Law Journal, pp. 766-84, 12, 6, 2006. 
11 Jürgen Neyer: The justice Deficit of the EU and other International Organisations, pp. 
199-222 in: C. Joerges/P. F. Kjaer: Transnational Standards of Social Protection. 
Contrasting European and International Governance, ARENA Report, No. 5, 2008, 
Olso (available at www.reconproject.eu). 
12 Kai-Uwe Hellmann: Gemeinwohl und Systemvertrauen. Vorschläge zur Modernisie-
rung alteuropäische Begriffe, pp. 77-110 in: H. Münkler/K. Fischer (Hrsg.): Gemein-
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substantiate their operations towards their environments. 
Such justifications are however paradoxical in nature, as they always are 
self-justifications. They are internal operations which are based on the struc-
ture’s own understanding of the expectations emerging within their environ-
ments. A common feature of social structures, including a hybrid such as the 
EU, is therefore that they develop strategies intended to “cover up” the para-
doxical nature of such justifications. They construct semantic artifacts inter-
nally which they can claim are external in nature. The religious system refers 
to a concept of God, the economic system to the market, the (democratic) po-
litical system to the people and the legal system to systems of (natural) rights. 
Hence, these systems can claim that their operations merely reflect the will of 
God, market demand, the will of the people or self-evident universal rights. 
These metaphors are assigned a foundational quality, but they also serve as 
mirrors which the respective functional systems use in order to scrutinize 
themselves, thereby potentially increasing their level of reflexivity. Hence, 
these concepts provide the functional systems in question with the possibility 
of internally evaluating and substantiating their operations. 
Within the political system, such practices are also described by the concept 
of legitimacy. As indicated, democratic political systems derive their claim for 
legitimacy through reference to the will of the people, who the rulers claim to 
represent. But in addition, the political system has engaged in a specific strat-
egy of reflexive “self-binding” through a carefully developed “partnership” 
with the legal system. This strategy falls under the name constitutionalization. 
In a narrow sense, constitutions serve as structural couplings between the legal 
and the political systems, thereby allowing the former to rely on legislation en-
acted in the political system as a basis for its rights-based jurisprudence.13 In 
the same way, the political system accepts limitations to its autonomy through 
a legal framing of its activities. The legal framing diminishes the contingent 
character of political operations, thereby serving as a tool which facilitates a 
stabilization of the expectations arising in the environment vis-à-vis the politi-
cal system. This is vital since the continued functioning of social structures is 
conditioned by generally stable expectations concerning the environment 
within which they operate. It is exactly this kind of stability which the “rule of 
law” ensures for the political system (as well as for other social systems) since 
the central function of law is the stabilization of normative expectations. The 
                                                                                                                                                      
wohl und Gemeinsinn. Rhetoriken und Perspektiven sozial-moralischer Orientierung 
(Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2002), pp. 99. 
13 Niklas Luhmann: Verfassung als evolutionäre Errungenschaft, 176-220 in: Rechtshis-
torisches Journal. 9, 1990. 
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political system can therefore claim legitimacy by referring to the legal fram-
ing of its operations as this, in principle, guarantees that its impact on the re-
maining parts of society is reflected in the selection of its operations. 
As previously indicated, constitutionalism was largely oriented towards the 
relationship between law and politics in the era of classical modernity.14 The 
radicalization of modernity in the latter half of the 20th century has however 
placed the nation states, and thereby the nation-state model of constitutional-
ism, under increased pressure. As a consequence, it is possible to observe two 
interrelated developments: Firstly, a move towards societal constitutionalism, 
in that the legal system increasingly engages in couplings that possess a consti-
tutional quality, with social structures falling outside the realm of the political 
system.15 Secondly, within the emerging post-modern paradigm of trans-
national law, it is argued that new types of law (such as Lex Mercatoria and 
Lex Digitalis) have emerged and that these forms of law operate within a con-
text of “extreme self-reference”. This arises because the functional synthesis 
(Funktionssynthese) between the legal and political systems, which was made 
possible in the nation-state realm through structural couplings between the le-
gal and the political systems via constitutions and legislative acts, is not or at 
least only partially in place, at the trans-national level. Hence, trans-national 
law is not capable of relying on legislation enacted by the political system to 
provide external reference points for its jurisprudence. Instead trans-national 
law is forced to rely on itself to a degree which is even more radical than has 
traditionally been the case at the nation-state level.16 In contrast to classical in-
ternational law, new forms of trans-national law therefore, increasingly rely on 
self-defined principles.17 Global and regional political-administrative GS are 
                                                 
14 As illustrated by Reinhart Koselleck the limitation of constitutions to the relationship 
between law and politics is however a specifically modern phenomenon. In the Midd-
le Ages constitutions occurred in multiple forms. See Reinhart Koselleck: ’Begriffsge-
schichtliche Probleme der Verfassungsgeschichtsschreibung’, pp. 365-82 in R. Kosel-
leck: Begriffsgeschichten: Studien zur Semantik und Pragmatik der politischen und 
Sozialen Sprache (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2006). 
15 For different perspectives on societal constitutionalism see David Sciulli: Theory of 
Societal Constitutionalism: Foundations of a Non-Marxist Critical Theory (New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 1992) and Gunther Teubner: ‘Societal Constitu-
tionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional Theory?’, pp. 3-28 in C. Jo-
erges/I-J. Sand/G. Teubner (Eds.): Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004). 
16 Marc Amstutz/Vaios Karavas: ’Rechtsmutation: Zu Genese und Evolution des Rechts 
im transnationalen Raum’, Rechtsgeschichte, pp. 14-32, 8, 2006. 
17 For international and trans-national economic law see Maria Panezi: ‘Sources of Law 
in Transition. Re-visiting General Principles of International Law’, Ancilla Iuris 
(www.anci.ch), pp. 66-79, 2007. 
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confronted with a similar situation since they increasingly expand their opera-
tions without being subject to a formal legal framing. If law is activated at all, 
this tends to happen ex-post.18 Scholars who celebrate the intrinsic link be-
tween the rule of law and democracy as a key accomplishment of modernity, 
have observed this with some concern.19 Positive interpretations of this devel-
opment have, on the other hand, emphasized that “hard” legal norms are 
merely being replaced or complemented by “soft” legal norms, acting as func-
tional equivalents of hard norms, at the trans-national level.20 Whatever inter-
pretation is chosen, the emergence of a dense net of trans-national structures 
does however imply a break with, or at least a transformation of, traditional 
concepts of constitutionalism, since the legal framing of non-nation state po-
litical-administrative structures assumes a different form compared to the clas-
sical modern forms which emerged in the nation-state context.21 
3. Partial Statehood 
When “applying” the above post-modern perspective to the EU, certain “mis-
fits” are however apparent. The EU fulfils Luhmann’s minimalist definition of 
a state,22 as it consists of a political and a legal system structurally coupled 
through a constitutional framework. Hence, although imperfect, a functional 
synthesis between law and politics can actually be observed in the EU context. 
In addition, the EU’s political system is capable of relying on a hierarchically 
organized Weberian bureaucratic machinery of considerable magnitude. The 
EU is moreover, structurally coupled to a territory and has (tentatively) devel-
oped a concept of citizenship. Within the governing dimension, it relies on a 
                                                 
18 Karl-Heinz Ladeur: ‘The Changing Role of the Private in Public Governance – The 
Erosion of Hierarchy and the Rise of a New Administrative Law of Cooperation. A 
Comparative Approach’, EUI Working Papers Law, 9 ( 2002), p 32. 
19 Jürgen Habermas: ‘Die postnationale Konstellation und die Zukunft der Demokratie’, 
pp. 91-169 in: J. Habermas: Die postnationale Konstellation. Politische Essays 
(Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1998); J. Habermas: Faktizität und Geltung. 
Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und demokratischen Rechtsstaats (Frankfurt 
am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992), p. 167. 
20 E.g. David M. Trubek/Patrick Cottrell/Mark Nance: ‘‘Hard Law’ and EU Integration’, 
pp. 65-94 in: G. de Burca & J. Scott (Eds.): Law and New Governance in the EU and 
the US (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006). 
21 Neil Walker: ‘Post-Constituent Constitutionalism’, pp. 247-268 in: M. Loughlin and 
N. Walker (Eds.): The Paradox of Constitutionalism (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
22 Niklas Luhmann: Politik der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main, Surhkamp Verlag, 
2000), p. 390 f. 
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distinction between the public and private spheres of society and has adopted 
traditional state symbols (flag, hymn etc.). These state-like features are more-
over, reinforced by the understanding that the EU must be regarded as an 
autonomous phenomenon since its political system has developed its own pol-
icy programs and, with considerable success, has also been able to ensure im-
plementation of these programs, just as the EU legal system, as already indi-
cated, has established its own legal order and independent sources of authority. 
If we consider that the 19th- and 20th-century nation states, defined by their mo-
nopoly on political and legal authority within a given territory, are anomalies 
whose reign lasted for only a relatively short time span of social develop-
ment,23 it is therefore possible to regard nation states as one possible variant 
among other forms of state, thereby making it possible to argue that the EU 
also falls within the state category.24 
Such a “traditionalist” view does not however, sufficiently emphasize the 
differences between the EU and the nation states. Only a faint distinction can be 
made between policy programs and polity structure in EU. Instead, the evolution 
of the constitutional structure and specific policy programs such as the estab-
lishment of the customs union, the common agricultural policy, the internal 
market and the economic and monetary union have gone hand in hand, in the 
sense that the launch of all these policy programs implied new treaties altering 
the EU’s constitutional structure. Moreover, no distinction exists between gov-
ernment and opposition in the EU setting. The EU relies on collective binding 
decisions but has no means of ensuring compliance through negative sanctions 
and hence no Weberian territorial control exists.25 Although the distinctions be-
tween the political and administrative levels are also blurred at the nation state 
level,26 the EU embodies the perfect dissolution of this distinction through its 
special form of “political administration”.27 This is not only the case within the 
                                                 
23 E.g. Neil MacCormick: ‘Beyond the Sovereign State’, The Modern Law Review, pp. 
1-18, 56, 1, 1993. 
24 Rudolf Stichweh: ’Dimensionen des Weltstaats im System der Weltpolitik’, pp. 25-36 
in: M. Albert/R. Stichweh (Hrsg.): Weltstaat und Weltstaatlichkeit. Beobachtungen 
globaler politischer Strukturbildung (Wiesbaden, VS Verlag, 2007), 26 ff. 
25 The EU does not fulfill Pierre Bourdieu’s revised Weberian definition of the state 
either, as he defines the state as the institution which „successfully claims the mono-
poly of the legitimate use of physical and symbolic violence over a definite territory 
and over the totality of the corresponding population”; See Pierre Bourdieu: ‘Rethin-
king the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field’, Sociological Theory, 
pp. 1-18, 12, 1, 1994, p. 3. 
26 Hans D. Jarass: Politik und Bürokratie als Elemente der Gewaltenteilung (München, 
C.H. Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1975), especially pp. 125-37. 
27 Andreas Bücker/Sabine Schlacke: ’Die Entstehung einer politischen Verwaltung 
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realm of GS, but also within the Commission, where the Commissioners’ roles 
fall between those of politicians and civil servants, just as the personal cabinets 
of the Commissioners continue to assume a dual political and administrative 
role.28 Consequently, the EU has also been characterized as a Weberian instru-
ment of rule (Herrschaftsinstrument) without a master.29 
Thus, the EU is a hybrid structure which oscillates between the structure of 
a state and that of trans-national governance, in the sense that it contains ele-
ments of both forms at the same time. It consists of a complex bundle of het-
erogeneous and partly contradictory juridical, political and administrative 
processes.30 This is also reflected in its reliance on the key distinction (Leitdis-
tinktion) between governing and governance and its position “in-between” the 
nation states and the global realm. 
4. The Integration Overlay 
The heterogenity of the European conglomerate is countered through the estab-
lishment of certain unity insofar as the different processes, although to differ-
ent degrees, are subordinated to an integrationist logic, which is expressed in 
the Union’s regulatory idea of creating an “ever closer union” and which tends 
to make integration an objective in itself (Selbstzweck). 
Subordination to the objective of integration helps explain why the political 
system in the nation-state form continuously encounter disappointments when-
ever they attempt to control the operations of the EU. Even when their priori-
ties appear to be fully accepted, as was the case with the United Kingdom 
                                                                                                                                                      
durch EG-Ausschüsse – Rechtstatsachen und Rechtsentwicklungen’, pp. 161-256 in: 
J. Falke/C. Joerges (Hrsg.): Das Ausschußwesen der Europäischen Union. Die Praxis 
der Risikoregulierung im Binnenmarkt und ihre rechtliche Verfassung (Nomos Ver-
lag, Baden-Baden, 2000). 
28 Sonja P. Riekmann: Die kommissarische Neuordnung Europas. Das Dispositiv der 
Integration (Wien, Springer Verlag, 1998). For a historical account of the function of 
the Commissioners’ office see also Otto Hintze: ’Der Commissarius und seine Bedeu-
tung in der allgemeinen Verwaltungsgeschichte. Eine vergleichende Studie’, pp. 78-
112 in: O. Hintze: Beamtentum und Bürokratie (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
[1910] 1981). 
29 Niklas Luhmann: ’Europa als Problem der Weltgesellschaft’, Berliner Debatte, pp. 3-
7, 2, 1994, p. 6. 
30 Inger-Johanne Sand: ‘Understanding the European Union/European Economic Area as 
Systems of Functionally Different Processes’, pp. 93-110 in: P. Fitzpatrick & J. H. 
Bergeron: Europe’s Other: European Law Between Modernity and Postmodernity 
(Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 1998).  
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(UK) during the negotiations of the Single European Act (SEA) in the mid 
1980s, such political priorities are merely “translated” and they consequently 
assume a completely different connotation and purpose when transferred from 
the sphere of the MS to the EU sphere. In the specific case of the SEA, and to 
the surprise of the UK government, the move towards negative integration 
through the abolishment of barriers to trade was intrinsically linked to a move 
towards positive integration through re-regulation at the European level. 
Hence, the Thatcher government quite clearly shared the naivety of the inter-
governmentalist brand of EU researchers in believing that the process could be 
controlled on the basis of nation-state priorities even though the integration 
process is guided by a logic which is substantially different compared to the 
kind of logic guiding MS politics.31 
In other words, it is possible to observe a deeply-rooted division between 
the forms of policy making in the EU context compared to the MS contexts. 
There have been countless attempts to explain that the EU is a “normal” 
power-based political system.32 However, power politics is based on the ability 
to ensure subordination on the basis of a distinction between superiority and 
inferiority (Machtüberlegenheit/Machtunterlegenheit) through the possible de-
ployment of negative sanctions.33 But the EU does not possess such power and 
has therefore been compelled to resort to other means than force in order to 
achieve its objectives.34 Moreover, in established democracies the traditional 
distinction between superiority and inferiority has increasingly been replaced 
with the distinction between government and opposition. As already indicated, 
this distinction has not materialised at the EU level. As opposed to the political 
system in its nation-state form, the measure of success within the EU is not 
therefore related to the government/opposition distinction, but instead, con-
cerns whether integration is progressing or at a standstill.35 
                                                 
31 For an intergovernmentalist view on the emergence of the SEA see; Andrew Movrac-
sik: ‘Negotiating the Single European Act: national interests and conventional state-
craft in the European Community’, International Organization, pp. 19-56, winter, 
1991. 
32 E.g. Simon Hix: The Political System of the European Union (Basingstoke, Macmil-
lian, 1999). 
33 Christian Borch: ‘Systemic Power. Luhmann, Foucault and Analytics of Power’, Acta 
Sociologica, pp. 155-67, 48, 2, 2005; Niklas Luhmann: Politik der Gesellschaft 
(Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2000), pp. 88 and pp. 97; Niklas Luhmann: 
‘Theorie der Politischen Opposition’, Zeitschrift für Politik, pp. 13-26, 36, 1, 1989. 
34 ChristianJoerges/Michael Zürn (Eds.): Law and Governance in Postnational Europe. 
Compliance Beyond the Nation-State (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
35 Guy Verhofstadt arrived at similar conclusions in that he compares the integration 
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Moreover, the key element of power, namely its exercise, necessitates 
knowledge of who is exercising power, or at least the existence of a symbolic 
structure which one can assume, constitutes the centre of power. The absence 
of the government/opposition distinction means, however, that there is no 
clearly identifiable centre of power within the EU. Whether governing 
(Regieren) takes place at all within the EU therefore remains a relevant ques-
tion36 since the kind of Schmittian decisionism, which is an inherent part of the 
self-understanding of the political system in the MS form, does not exist within 
the EU. Instead, as embodied in the “Monnet Method”, the EU has identified 
integration as a “technical task”, where traditional power politics is regarded as 
an obstacle to integration rather than a tool of integration.37 Indeed, every time 
the EU has pursued integration within areas which have been conceived of as 
politically crucial by the MS, and which they have been strong enough to re-
produce within their respective national settings, it has encountered a wall of 
resistance. It is therefore not surprising that the “technical tools” with which 
integration has been pursued have been legal instruments, which dominated the 
1960s and 1970s, market instruments, mainly during the 1980s and early 
1990s, and governance instruments from the mid-1990s onwards. In contrast, 
genuine political acts in the nation-state sense have largely been avoided and 
when tried have led to disappointment. Obvious examples of such disappoint-
ments include the failure of the European Defence Community in the 1950s 
and the Constitutional Treaty (CT) in the first decade of the new millennium. 
The transformation of the CT into a mere “technical exercise” through the Lis-
bon Reform Treaty moreover, represents a classic circumvention strategy. One 
of the strongest features of the integration process is in fact, the tendency to 
transform political issues into technical issues in order to allow integration to 
proceed.38 For example, the transfer of monetary policy from the national to 
the European level after Maastricht implied that the majority of the national 
central banks, which had not been politically independent before the launch of 
the Maastricht process, gained such independence. Moreover, the independ-
ence granted to the European Central Bank, as evidenced by the Treaty of 
                                                                                                                                                      
process with riding a bike. One needs to keep pedalling in order not to fall off. See 
Guy Verhofstadt: Les etats-unis d'Europe (Bruxelles, Luc Pire, 2006). 
36 Markus Jachtenfuchs/Michèle Knodt (Hrsg.): Regieren in internationalen Institutio-
nen (Opladen, Leske + Budrich, 2002). 
37 E.g. Rainer Schmalz-Bruns: ‘Deliberativer Supranationalismus’, Zeitschrift für Inter-
nationale Beziehungen, pp. 185-242, 6, 1998. 
38 Maurizio Bach: Die Bürokratisierung Europas. Verwaltungseliten, Experten und poli-
tische Legitimation in Europa (Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 1999). 
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Maastricht, even exceeds the independence of the German central bank.39 
Another characteristic of EU politics is that the EU takes an “opportunistic” 
approach to substantial matters. In the case of the SEA, the fiercest resistance 
came from the UK government and accordingly its liberalist preferences were 
incorporated to the extent necessary to overcome UK resistance at the same 
time as the “hidden” re-regulation agenda was played down. Today, with inte-
gration increasingly encroaching on the welfare and labour market regimes of 
the MS, the strongest resistance seems to be from France. Accordingly the lib-
eralist approach, which emerged in order to overcome UK resistance, is slowly 
being substituted with a “flexsecurity” approach, seeking to combine the ad-
vantages of a free market with the upholding of national welfare systems, that 
has been specifically invented to overcome French resistance. Viewed from the 
Brussels perspective, continued integration remained the primary objective in 
both cases however and the choice of actual policy therefore remains of secon-
dary importance. On the other hand, this does not mean that economic con-
cerns (e.g. efficiency and competitiveness), political concerns (e.g. in terms of 
influence on and the popularity of specific measures) or ethical concerns (e.g. 
in relation to risk regulation) does not play a role. It only indicates that such 
concerns are not primary and that they remain subordinated to the integration 
imperative. Moreover, such subordination is not necessarily problematic since 
most problems can be addressed in a multitude of ways, and often in a way 
which will enable the objective of integration and other objectives to be 
achieved simultaneously. As pointed out by G. Majone,40 the primacy of inte-
gration does, however, create a structural bias which over time tends to sys-
tematically produce sub-optimal outcomes, for example when viewed from an 
economic perspective.41 
More concretely, the integration overlay is reproduced through the instituti-
onal balance (IB) which serves as the skeleton of the EU’s governing dimensi-
on.42 In the literature, this concept is often considered identical to that of a 
                                                 
39 Giandomenico Majone: Dilemmas of European integration: the ambiguities and pit-
falls of integration by stealth (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 38-39. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Not surprisingly the EU has therefore been faced with continued public criticism. An 
anecdotic but illuminating example of such criticism can be found in a critical com-
ment on an European Commission discussion paper on mortgage credit in the Europe-
an Union entitled ‘Integration is not necessarily the right concept to guide integration’ 
where David Miles, the Chief Economist from Morgan Stanley, made the following il-
luminating statement: ‘The Commission needs to keep in mind that what matters is ef-
ficiency, rather than integration as an end in itself’, Financial Times, 16 Dec. 2005. 
42 In the Köster case the European Court of Justice (ECJ) explicitly recognized the con-
cept of IB as a central constitutional feature of the Community. See Einfuhrstelle v. 
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functional separation of powers.43 This view is however, based on a superficial 
understanding of the concepts. In the EU, legislative power is divided between 
the Commission, the Council and the EP; executive power is divided between 
the Commission, the Council and the MS; and juridical power is divided bet-
ween the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
and the MS courts. Thus “it simply appears impossible to characterize the se-
veral Community institutions as holders of one or the other power since a close 
analysis of their prerogatives does not indicate a clear-cut line between legisla-
tive and the executive branches of the Community government”.44 Hence, it is 
futile to claim that the EU is characterised by a functional separation of po-
wers, since none of the institutions monopolises a single function.45 On the  
other hand, this does not mean that the functional features of the legislative, 
executive and juridical forms of communication cannot be identified in relation 
to the EU. But the functional features are not attached to specific institutions, 
and it is exactly this lack of attachment of different forms of communication to 
corresponding organisational structures which makes the existing order diffe-
rent from the vision embodied in the modern concept of a functional separation 
of powers. 
As pointed out by Majone,46 the EU’s governing dimension rather resem-
bles an early modern mixed constitution since the main political-administrative 
institutions jointly share decisional and executive powers.47 Moreover, the 
principle of institutional autonomy, which resembles the autonomy of the “es-
tates” in the early-modern period, is a fundamental principle of the Union – 
                                                                                                                                                      
Köster, Case. No. C-25/70 [1970] ECR 1161, Nr. 6. 
43 E.g. Georg Haibach: ‘Separation and Delegation of Legislative Powers: A Compara-
tive Analysis’, pp. 53-66 in M. Andenas/A. Türk (Eds.): Delegated Legislation and 
the Role of Committees in the EC (The Hague, Kluwer, 2000); Koen Le-
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Europe’s Integrated Market, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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Community’, Common Market Law Review, pp. 11-35, 28, 1990, p. 13. 
45 That the Community is not based on a concept of functional separation of powers has 
also been recognized by the ECJ. See Joined Cases 188 to 190/80, France, Italy and 
United Kingdom vs. Commission [1982], ECR 2545, 2573. See also Georg Haibach: 
‘Comitology after Amsterdam: A Comparative Analysis of the Delegation of Legisla-
tive Powers’. EIPASCOPE, pp. 1-7, 3, 1997, p. 1.  
46 Giandomenico Majone: ‘Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity’, Euro-
pean Law Journal, pp. 319-39, 8, 3, 2002. 
47 For an overview over the concept of a mixed constitution see Alois Riklin: Macht-
teilung – Geschichte der Mischverfassung (Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesell-
schaft, 2005). 
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just as the principle of loyal cooperation was an important feature of early-
modern mixed polities as well as of the EU today.48 
The understanding of the EU as largely characterised by an “early-modern” 
form of power-sharing, where the Commission, the Council and the EP respec-
tively seem to fulfil the role of the King, the Lords and the Commons, helps 
explain the integrationist bias of EU policies. This results from the fact that 
power sharing gives the EU an organic character which is oriented towards es-
tablishing unity through the suppression of centrifugal tendencies.49 In princi-
ple, the IB ensures that all stakeholders have a say in the decision-making 
processes. Hence, the quest for increased integration is not just a regulatory 
principle guiding the EU’s policy programmes: integration is rather a meta-
norm through which the internal unity of the EU is established, given that the 
logic of integration is the mechanism through which cohesion between the le-
gal, political and administrative dimensions of the EU structure is created and 
continuously reaffirmed. 
The price paid for such unity is substantial however, as power sharing im-
plies that several institutional actors possess the ability to block decision-
making. Not surprisingly, this has led to the development of a complex system 
of pay-offs, which have been introduced in order to get priorities approved. For 
example, the common agricultural policy was developed as a pay-off to France 
to guarantee it would accept liberalisation of the market for industrial goods as 
advocated by Germany.50 The introduction of the SEA was, moreover, condi-
tioned by the increased introduction of regional and social funds, which served 
as a system of pay-offs to economically less advanced countries such as 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain in the 1980s and 1990s and the Central 
and Eastern European countries today. This also explains why the EU has 
never confined its role to that of a “regulatory state”, as advocated by Ma-
jone.51 The reason being that the EU’s institutional setting creates a structural 
                                                 
48 Giandomenico Majone: ‘Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity’, Euro-
pean Law Journal, pp. 319-39, 8, 3, 2002. 
49 The organic character of the Community was also acknowledged by the former presi-
dent of the Commission Jacques Santer: “L’efficacité de la méthode communautaire, 
... repose sur la bonne coopération, sur une complémentarité organique, entre les insti-
tutions” see Jacques Santer: L’avenir de l’Europe.. Quel rôle pour la Commission? 
Eloge de la méthode communautaire, European University Institute, Jean Monnet 
Lecture, 20 Oct. 1995. Also quoted in Georg Haibach: ‘The History of Comitology’, 
pp. 185-215 in M. Andenas/A. Türk (Eds.): Delegated Legislation and the Role of 
Committees in the EC (The Hague, Kluwer, 2000), p. 215. 
50 Andrew Moravcsik: The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 159.  
51 Giandomenico Majone: Regulating Europe (London, Routledge, 1996). For a critique 
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frame within which the exercise of regulatory functions is conditioned by the 
ability, using re-distributive policies, to “bribe” institutional actors who are 
able to block decision-making, and who will most likely, witness a sub-optimal 
outcome from common regulatory approaches.52 In terms of policy outcome, 
strong reliance on mixed government features, which are merely oriented to-
wards the establishment of negative limitations on the exercise of power, also 
explains the strong orientation towards “conservation” which characterises 
policies such as the common agricultural and the common fisheries policy. Not 
only have these policies proved inherently difficult to reform, but they also 
seem to be defended by the Commission for the sole reason that they embody 
the idea of almost complete integration.53 
In contrast to the above perspective, gradual expansion of the co-decision 
procedure and the rise of the EP could be interpreted as a tentative move to-
wards the establishment of a federal dual system with the Council and the EP as 
the central players. Such a development can, moreover, be interpreted as a first 
step towards a clearer functional differentiation of powers.54 But the rise of the 
EP, increasingly acting on an equal footing with the Commission and the Coun-
cil, has also augmented the complexity of the institutional setting and reinforced 
the character of the EU as a structure where all representative institutions have a 
say in all decisions. This development is, moreover, strengthened by the rise of 
the European Council which today shares de facto the right to initiate legislation 
with the Commission. Consequently, the Community Method and especially the 
co-decision variant, featuring as the central and most mature element of the 
EU’s legislative structure, might increasingly resemble the constitutional struc-
tures of political systems in the nation-state form.  
Meanwhile, new institutional forms and procedures, which reinforce the 
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52 See also Koen Lenaerts: ‘Some Reflections on the Separation of Powers in the Euro-
pean Community’, Common Market Law Review, pp. 11-35, 28, 1990; Xénophon A. 
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net Working Paper 3, 2001. pp. 11. 
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characteristics of the EU as an integrationist structure based upon shared pow-
ers, continue to emerge, through the continued expansion of the integration 
process. Hence, the EU’s institutional development seems to be characterised 
by a contradictory dual movement whereby the characteristics of power shar-
ing expand continuously while, at the same time, tentative moves towards a 
clearer functional separation of powers can be observed within the most devel-
oped areas of the institutional setting. With these contradictory developments 
in mind, it is therefore not surprising that the “expanding universe” of the EU 
seems to be “stumbling along”, as its contradictory “early-modern” and “mod-
ern” features both seem to be strengthened, thereby creating a setting charac-
terised by constant internal tensions between the two forms.  
5. Partial Constitutionalism 
Since H. Rasmussen broke the taboo and pointed out what everyone already 
knew concerning the “legal activism” of the ECJ,55 it has become acceptable 
to claim in public that the ECJ has been subject to a different kind of rational-
ity than a purely legal one. Rasmussen views this as an unfortunate “politicisa-
tion” of the ECJ. Bearing in mind the subordination of the EU political policies 
to the logic of integration, one might be able to consider legal activism as re-
flecting a similar situation whereby the legal/legal-law (Recht/Unrecht) dis-
tinction of the ECJ, acting as an organization within the realm of the legal sys-
tem, is also subordinated to the integrationist logic. Such subordination does 
not imply a complete exclusion of legal rationality, but merely indicates that 
the operations of the ECJ are subject to a “double binary coding”. To the ex-
tent that social systems, in the form of interaction, organizational or functional 
systems, are understood as Sinn (meaning) producing systems56, such limita-
tions can also be understood as a form of “under-differentiation” which pro-
duces “over-reductions” of Sinn. Not surprisingly, the occurrence of such 
forms of over-reduction has therefore led to the development of regulatory 
ideas and normative models concerning the possible transformation of the ECJ, 
either into a European supreme court57 or into a court capable of safeguarding 
                                                 
55 Hjalte Rasmussen: On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice (Dorddrecht, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1986); Joseph H. H. Weiler: ‘The Court of Justice on Trial’, Com-
mon Market Law Review, pp. 555-589, 24, 1987. 
56 We are here following Luhmann’s Husserl inspired suggestion to understand meaning 
(Sinn) as the basic element of society. See Niklas Luhmann: Sinn als Grundbegriff der 
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57 E.g. Ingolf Pernice: ‘Maastricht, Staat und Demokratie’, Die Verwaltung, pp. 449-488, 
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its autonomy through increased self-restraint.58 
However, the EU has also undergone a rapid constitutionalization process 
over the last decades.59 This process contradicts the logic of integration. As al-
ready indicated, a central function of constitutions is to enable the legal system 
to observe the system-internal processes of the political system while the sys-
tem-internal processes of the legal system are simultaneously observed by the 
political system.60 Processes of constitutionalization therefore tend to occur 
within the context of increased differentiation between law and politics, arising 
from increased social complexity.61 Accordingly, the ongoing constitutionali-
zation process can be understood as reflecting an increased dissolution of the 
integration overlay. The tendencies towards dissolution should, however, not 
necessarily be understood as indicating a failure for the EU since the EU in 
praxis remain committed to the regulatory principle of establishing “an ever 
closer union” through increased integration, which again implies eventual 
transformation into some sort of state. In this sense, the regulatory principle of 
statehood through integration implies “self-dissolution” in that the move to-
wards modern statehood implies that the organic unity established through the 
institutional balance will be replaced with the kind of metaphorical unity that 
characterizes modern states.62 The constitutionalization of the EU is, however, 
not only characterized by an increased horizontal dissolution of the EU’s unity, 
but also by vertical hierarchisation. The differentiation of increasingly inde-
pendent dimensions of law and politics is conditioned by a move towards a 
merger of the EU dimensions of law and politics with their respective counter-
parts at the nation-state level. Thus, the EU dimensions increasingly form hier-
archical peaks in new European-wide subsystems of law and politics, as con-
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cretized through the legal doctrines concerning “direct effect”63, “superiority 
of Community law”64 and “pre-emption”65. The move towards hierarchisation 
therefore increasingly blurs the distinction between the EU and the MS legal 
orders. 
On the other hand, the crucial question of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, the ques-
tion of who has the competence to decide where the border between EU and 
MS competences lies, remains unresolved because the ECJ claim this role for 
itself without such claim being acknowledged by all constitutional courts of 
the MS. In addition, the interrelated political question of the fundamental na-
ture of the embryonic polity remains largely unresolved. As indicated by the 
failure of the constitutional treaty, there are clear limitations to how constitu-
tional the EU can be.66 Consequently, the EU seems to be oscillating some-
where between being a separate legal order and engaging in a merger with the 
national legal orders. The resistance of the MS, seems, in other words, to trans-
form the quest for “complete” statehood into an unattainable mirage even 
though a certain level of constitutionalization has been achieved. Instead the 
EU has entered into a state of “permanent dissolution”, in the sense that it con-
tinues to operate on the basis of the regulatory idea of state-building through 
the dissolution of the unity established by the integration overlay, whilst con-
fronting structural conditions which make the idea unachievable. The relation-
ship between the EU legal order and the MS legal orders therefore remains 
fundamentally unresolved.67 
6. Horizontal Constitutionalism I 
One of the most original attempts to re-conceptualize the relationship between 
the EU and the MS legal orders is illustrated by the conflict of laws approach. 
This approach departs from a paradox in that conflict of laws methodology is 
oriented towards ensuring unity whilst maintaining substantial diversity. Thus, 
it is an approach which is particularly well suited to tackle the fundamentally 
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unresolved character of the interaction between the different legal orders char-
acterizing the European context in the sense that it is an approach which takes 
the EU’s “slogan” concerning “unity in diversity” seriously. 
As argued by C. Joerges, the EU courts have intentionally developed 
“meta-norms”, with the objective of achieving stabilization of conflicts be-
tween the different legal orders without breaking down or replacing any of the 
involved orders. This understanding of EU law is based on a functionalist per-
spective. Conflicts emerge between MS because of an increasingly higher level 
of interdependence between them, thereby creating the functional need for 
conflict resolution. The key argument promoted by Joerges is however norma-
tive; increased interdependence means that the MS are increasingly character-
ized by a democratic deficit since the democratic decisions of the MS are gen-
erating extra-territorial effects with greater frequency. These effects are not re-
flected in the democratic decisions of those states, since their only point of ref-
erence is their own constituency and not those of their neighbors. EC law (and 
EU integration as such) should therefore be understood as compensatory 
measures which ensure that the extra-territorial effects of MS actions are taken 
into account. The European constitutionalization process should consequently 
be understood as complementary to nation-state constitutionalism, as its objec-
tive is to ensure a reduction in negative externalities arising from the opera-
tions of national political systems.68 
According to Joerges, the development of European “meta-norms” has pro-
vided a legal framework within which regulatory structures such as the “new 
approach” through mutual recognition of technical standards and the delega-
tion of standardization activities to private actors, 69 as well as the emergence 
and expansion of Comitology and agencies have been made possible. It is 
therefore possible to observe a relationship of mutual increase between the 
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European constitutionalization process and the emergence of GS. In addition, 
the incremental build-up of a European legal framework has also served as a 
frame for the continued expansion of the political dimension of the EU. Hence, 
it is possible to consider the EU as characterized by a symbiotic relationship 
between three dimensions: firstly, the “semi-hierarchical” legal order; sec-
ondly, the political dimension as embodied in the triangular relationship be-
tween Council, Commission and Parliament, and thirdly, a hybrid administra-
tive infrastructure as provided for by the GS.70 
Joerges’ version of the conflict of laws approach encapsulates the emer-
gence and purpose of the European project within a highly elegant construc-
tion. Moreover, its central strength lies in the fact that it does not deduct a 
normative vision for Europe from a purely analytical ideal model concerning 
how Europe ought to be. Instead it departs from an inductive functional per-
spective, the main focus of which is the pragmatic solution of common prob-
lems. It provides a normative justification for the processes of conflict resolu-
tion which evolves in Europe on a day-to-day basis. The conflict of laws ap-
proach is in touch with reality. 
Two problems emerge however: firstly, the conflict of laws approach does 
not provide an answer to the question of how the instrumentialization of EU 
law as a vehicle of integration can be curbed. The increased interdependence, 
the functional problem from which the conflict of laws approach departs, is to 
a large extent created through EU integration and the pro-integrationist legal 
activism of the Courts. Hence, the European legal system has itself played a 
pivotal role by paving the way for increased interdependence which – accord-
ing to Joerges - provides the normative justification for the development of 
meta-norms by the European Courts. From this perspective, Joerges’ conflict 
of laws approach therefore merely provides a language with which the produc-
ers of EU law can engage in a self-justifying exercise of their own achieve-
ments. 
Hence, if the normative purpose of Joerges’ conflict of laws approach is 
deemed viable, it needs to be complemented by a focus on constitutional safe-
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guards capable of breaking up the integrationist logic and curbing the legal ac-
tivism of the European courts. A form of legal activism, which Joerges (in col-
laboration with F. Rödl) himself also has fiercely criticized in relation to the 
Viking and Laval judgments.71 As we will shortly see, the vertical relations be-
tween the Commission and the ECJ on the one hand, and the MS on the other 
hand, therefore deserve greater attention. In addition, the possibility of 
strengthening the EU’s political dimension through a democratization of the 
EU must be addressed since it is the failure of the EU’s political dimension to 
provide the courts with suitable reference points through legislative acts, which 
has made the legal activism of the courts possible. 
Secondly: as pointed out by D. Chalmers, Joerges’ variant of the conflict of 
laws approach amounts to a re-territorialization of authority.72 The main con-
cern of Joerges is the ability of the law to curb the territorially based power of 
the nation states. This is a relevant objective. But as argued by Chalmers, terri-
torially vested authority is no longer the only form of authority. The mutation 
of the EU into a conglomerate compromising a multitude of governing and 
governance structures has undercut the claim of territorially based powers as 
the only source of authority, since the different elements of the EU increas-
ingly, have become independent structures operating in an increasingly 
autonomous manner. Hence, the different dimensions of the European con-
glomerate to a large extent, claim authority through recourse to scientific 
knowledge and other forms of “expertise”. The conflict of laws approach pro-
moted by Joerges, does not however sufficiently address this issue,73 although 
the need to do so is inherent in his diagnosis of the existence of an unholy alli-
ance between the legal formalism of the ECJ and the deployment of soft law 
techniques.74 An alliance which illustrates that soft law techniques tend to be 
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Comitology. Deliberative Supranationalism is however situated on a different level as 
it is does not deal with the overall constitutional structure of the EU. 
74 Christian Joerges/Florian Rödl: Von der Entformalisierung europäischer Politik und 
dem Formalismus europäischer Rechtssprechung im Umgang mit dem “sozialen Defi-
zit” des Integrationsprojekts. Ein Beitrag aus Anlass der Urteile des EuGH in den 
Rechtssachen Viking und Laval, ZERP-Diskussionspapier 2, 2008. 
 21
instrumentalised in order to promote increased integration.75 
A central reason for this is that his approach remains based on a traditional 
variant of the conflict of laws, which focuses on vertical conflicts between 
Brussels and the MS and especially on horizontal conflicts between territori-
ally defined state entities in the MS form. But these two forms of conflict dif-
fer significantly from those which emerge in a radically functionally differenti-
ated world. As argued by G. Teubner, collisions between functionally differen-
tiated structures are increasingly becoming a defining element globally.76 
Hence, in relation to the EU, operating as a hybrid between global structures 
and the nation-states, it is – besides vertical conflicts – possible to observe two 
forms of horizontal conflicts developing at the same time, namely those be-
tween states which Joerges focuses upon, and those between the different func-
tionally differentiated spheres of society.77 Risk regulation, which is a key ac-
tivity of the EU, serves as a forceful illustration of the latter, insofar as differ-
ent forms of rationality, arising from different functionally differentiated 
spheres such as the economy, environment and health tend to collide.78  
In relation to broader societal conflicts Joerges’ approach however remains 
oriented towards classical forms of welfare state regulation, which, in their in-
ternal regulation, rely on a concept of stratificatory differentiation.79 The emer-
gences of a “another modernity” (Beck), have however reduced stratificatory 
differentiation from a phenomenon which served a central role in the internal 
stabilization of almost all spheres of society to a form which mainly is relevant 
in relation to the internal organization and stabilization of labor market regimes, 
which themselves are established through a functional delineation vis-à-vis other 
functionally delineated regimes. In its present form Joerges’ approach, thereby 
only deals with a limited aspect of societal organization just as it is only relevant 
in relation to the impact of European integration on this specific section of soci-
                                                 
75 For an example in relation to Research and Development policy see Poul F. Kjaer: 
Formalization or De-Formalization through Governance? in: R. Nickel (Ed.): Conflict 
of Laws or Laws of Conflict. ARENA Report Series, Oslo, 2009 forthcoming. 
76 Gunther Teubner: De collisione discursuum: Communicative Rationalities in Law, 
Morality and Politics, pp. 901-918, Cardozo Law Review, 17, 1996. 
77 That is of course also the case within nation states and at the trans-national level. 
“Double-horizontality” is however a particular strong feature of the EU. 
78 Poul Kjaer: ‘Rationality within REACH? On Functional Differentiation as the Struc-
tural Foundation of Legitimacy in European Chemicals Regulation’, EUI Working 
Papers (Law), nr. 18, 2007. 
79 See especially Christian Joerges/Florian Rödl: Von der Entformalisierung europäi-
scher Politik und dem Formalismus europäischer Rechtssprechung im Umgang mit 
dem “sozialen Defizit” des Integrationsprojekts. Ein Beitrag aus Anlass der Urteile 
des EuGH in den Rechtssachen Viking und Laval, ZERP-Diskussionspapier 2, 2008. 
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ety. A comprehensive constitutional approach, capable of grasping the defining 
features of the European integration phenomenon, therefore needs to reach be-
yond Joerges’ horizontal territorial (and indirectly also stratificatory) approach. 
His theory needs to be expanded into a three-dimensional structure since it 
should be capable of addressing vertical as well as both forms of horizontal (ter-
ritorial and functionally differentiated) conflicts. 
7. Vertical Constitutionalism 
The question of how the instrumentialization of EC law can be curbed leads 
directly to the question of how the balance between politics and law can be re-
configured in the EU context to ensure that the operations of the legal dimen-
sion converge with those of the political dimension. Until now the central im-
petus for increased integration has come from the Heads of State and Govern-
ments operating within the realm of the European Council. At the same time –
after the Commission has prepared the ground – the Council has played the 
principal role in the day-to-day making of integrative decisions. It is however 
exactly this form of policy-making which has proved inadequate when it 
comes to the development of constitutional principles and legislative acts ca-
pable of providing suitable reference points for the European courts. The reli-
ance on power sharing means that it is immensely difficult for the EU to pro-
duce coherent legal texts since sharing power between multiple institutions 
with the ability to block progress means that the outcome of legislative proc-
esses typically represents the lowest denominator. Dictated by the need to 
make political compromises, the result is that insufficient solutions are pro-
vided for pressing functional problems. In addition, systemic deficits occur be-
cause power sharing tends to produce legislation characterized by a mismatch 
of contradictory objectives and deliberately vague formulations. In other 
words, the EU’s political dimension systematically produces suboptimal out-
comes thereby creating decisional vacuums, forcing the courts to define the ac-
tual scope and intentions of community legislation.80 Hence, it is the defi-
ciency of the EU’s political dimension in the production of coherent legislative 
                                                 
80 A typical example is the recently adopted service directive, which essentially leaves it 
to the Courts to define the scope of the directive. See Directive 2006/123/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on services in the in-
ternal market. For an assessment see Susanne K. Schmidt: Competing in Markets, not 
Rules: The Conflict over the Single Services Market, pp. 31-54 in Christian Jo-
erges/Poul F. Kjaer: Transnational Standards of Social Protection. Contrasting Euro-
pean and International Governance, ARENA Report, No. 5, 2008, Olso (available at 
www.reconproject.eu).  
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texts which has prevented the emergence of an optimal functional synthesis be-
tween law and politics. As a result, the ECJ (and the Court of First Instance) 
are able to engage in legal activism based on their pro-integrationist bias. 
The standard solution proposed as a means of overcoming this problem has 
been increased politicization. In general, increased politicization is equated 
with increased democratization.81 The question of how or to what extent the 
EU can be democratized must however begin with an analysis of the structural 
conditions which must be in place in order for democratic structures to emerge 
and function. Democracy can be understood as a particular frame through 
which the political system observes its environment through reference to a col-
lective in the form of the people. This reference allows the political system to 
define the section of its environment which it deems relevant in its continual 
selection of operations. In addition, democracy can be understood as a specific 
mode of legally regulated collective decision making, characterized by a dif-
ferentiation of roles between government and opposition, which relies on the 
existence of a hierarchically organized and legally framed bureaucratic struc-
ture capable of implementing such collective decisions through the (potential) 
invoking of negative sanctions.82  
As already indicated, the EU only partially shares these characteristics of 
democracy and hence remains a “quasi-democracy”. The status as a “quasi-
democracy” is further reinforced by the absence of a singular form of Euro-
pean people (Staatsvolk). A solution has emerged with the concept of “multiple 
demoi”.83 Such conceptual “arm-twisting” will however not solve the real 
problem, namely the limited reach of democracy. Democratic decision-making 
remains conditioned by the existence of legal as well as organizational hierar-
chies, since collectively binding decision making is conditioned by the ability 
to ensure implementation and the possible deployment of negative sanctions. 
In other words: democracy remains a “parasite” on power84 because it is con-
ditioned by the existence of an instrument of rule and by a monopoly of power 
                                                 
81 E.g. Erik O. Eriksen & John Erik Fossum: ‘Europe at a Crossroads: Government or 
Transnational Governance?’, pp. 115-146 in: C. Joerges/I-J. Sand/G. Teubner (Eds.): 
Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004). 
82 Niklas Luhmann: ‘Die Zukunft der Demokratie’, pp. 126-32 in N. Luhmann: Soziolo-
gische Aufklärung, Band 4. Beiträge Zur Funktionalen Differenzierung der Gesell-
schaft (Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1994), pp. 127. 
83 Joseph H. H. Weiler: ‘Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos 
and the German Maastricht Decision’, European Law Journal, pp. 219-258, 1, 1995. 
84 Niklas Luhmann: Die Politik der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 
2000), p. 357. 
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through which democratically made decisions can be channeled.85 Democracy 
is therefore intrinsically linked to the existence of strong vertical political and 
legal control and demand structures on the basis of a distinction between the 
rulers and the ruled. This structural limitation explains why “radical democ-
racy”, encompassing society as whole, has never been able to manifest itself. 
Democracy remains a limited concept which is unable to manifest itself be-
yond the boundaries of the hierarchic order or the political system. 
The insight that democracy is impossible beyond the realm of hierarchy has 
profound implications for the feasibility of the objective of achieving a democ-
ratization of the EU, because it remains a structure which is partly based on 
governing and partly on governance. Since the governance dimension is not 
hierarchical in nature, it cannot be a subject of democratization. Hence, the 
governance dimension is not an un-democratic structure which has the poten-
tial to become a subject of democratization. Rather it is an a-democratic struc-
ture which is beyond the reach of democracy. Hence, calls for a “complete” 
democratization of the EU through a transfer of the basic features of nation 
state democracy to the EU cannot be realized since only the governing dimen-
sion of the EU can be subject to democratization. 
Alternatively, the attempt to grasp ongoing developments within the EU 
must be based on a dual approach. A pincer movement (Zangenbewegung) is 
required which on the one hand, explores the viability and consequences of in-
creased democratization of the governing dimension, whilst on the other hand, 
alternative concepts are developed to frame the governance dimension. From a 
constitutionalization perspective, the key issue is therefore how law can con-
tribute to the double-sided task of facilitating and curbing the exercise of 
power within the two dimensions whilst maintaining the carefully developed 
balance between the two dimensions. 
Regarding the governing dimension, the central problem involves reliance on 
the concept of institutional balance. But the real problem here is not “under-
democratization” but rather “under-differentiation”. This diagnosis also contains 
a possible answer to the problem of developing an adequate political “partner” 
for the legal system. This is because the tentative move towards transforming 
the institutional balance into a functionally differentiated structure resembling 
the classical modern differentiation between the legislative, the executive and 
                                                 
85 Hence, it is no coincidence that, in Europe, democracy first emerged after the creation 
of the territorial states and that it simply took the form of an exchange of the already 
existing sovereignty of the prince with the sovereignty of the people. See Norbert Eli-
as: Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation, Band 2 (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag 
[1938]1976). 
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the juridical branches advocated by Seyès and Kant, would potentially rational-
ize the system by granting specific institutions a monopoly on specific func-
tions. This would undermine the kind of blocking-capability which tends to re-
duce community legislation into a patchwork of contradictory objectives. Simul-
taneously, functional differentiation would ensure effective limitations on the 
exercise of power because specific institutions would be confined to the exercise 
of specific functions thereby making it possible to clearly identify the Letztver-
antwortliche institution. A stronger reliance on functional separation is therefore 
likely to improve the flexibility of the system and hence increase the EU’s abil-
ity to react to changes in its environment through the incorporation of new 
knowledge without relinquishing the “rule of law”. 
8. The Positioning of Governance Structures 
For the governance dimension the task is somewhat more complicated. The 
key issue involves the development of a concept of constitutionalization which 
ensures the stabilization of GS without damaging the flexibility of these struc-
tures, whilst maintaining the balance between the governing and governance 
dimensions. Hence, it is necessary to develop a concept which binds structures 
such as the OMC, Comitology and agencies within a coherent legal structure, 
whilst taking seriously the functional demand for integration. Two issues are 
therefore at stake; i) the positioning of the three forms of governance in rela-
tion to each other and ii) the internal organization of governance structures. 
In relation to the first problem, the proponents of the OMC have called for a 
constitutionalization of the OMC.86 Viewed from a traditional perspective on 
constitutionalism, this objective is based on an insoluble contradiction, in that 
purely political processes which operate outside the realm of law cannot be 
constitutionalized. From this perspective constitutionalization implies a legal 
framing of a social structure which facilitates the exercise of power whilst the 
versatility of the power structures are being reduced on the basis of a reference 
to a people which confers restricted authoritative power to political structures 
for a limited period of time. In the case of the EU however, it is the MS who 
confer power to the Union. In addition, in a strictly legal sense, the OMC does 
not imply that power is conferred on the EU: one of the most widely acclaimed 
                                                 
86 Jonathan Zeitlin: ‘Social Europe and Experimentalist Governance: Towards a New 
Constitutional Compromise?’ European Governance Papers (EUROGOV), 4, 2005; 
Charles Sabel/Jonathan Zeitlin: Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the EU, European Law Journal, Volume 14, Number 
3, May 2008 , pp. 271-327. 
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aims of the OMC is precisely to avoid further increases in the legal competen-
cies of the EU. Instead it is seen as a “pure” political process aimed at achiev-
ing results through “experimentation”. Hence, OMC processes are directly 
aimed at increasing the versatility of EU policy-making by surpassing legal 
constraints. The OMC therefore implies a break with the bonds between law 
and politics which have traditionally been celebrated as one of the most fun-
damental achievements of modernity and which were directly aimed at ensur-
ing a balance between versatility and stability. As the OMC represents an at-
tempt to remove the law’s “irritation” of the policy-making process, it is not 
surprising that its emergence has been greeted, mainly by the political scien-
tists, as a welcome innovation. Nor is it surprising that legal scholars have 
been much more reserved. 
Despite the unease of lawyers, the OMC will not go away. The OMC fulfils 
a specific “pre-integrative” function within the realm of the European integra-
tion process. Moreover and as already indicated, this function is not new.87 In-
stead the OMC merely professionalizes and formalizes the kind of pre-
integrative mutual observation between MS which has existed ever since the 
Community was established.88 From a functional perspective, the OMC is 
therefore neither a vehicle of deliberation nor merely an intrusive instrument. 
Such unhelpful dichotomies can be circumvented, by focusing on the useful-
ness of the OMC, as long as it remains strictly a preliminary tool, applied 
within policy areas where legal integration, conferring legal competencies to 
the EU, has not taken place. Policy areas that operate on the basis of relatively 
unrestrained forms of political rationality because relevant juridical frames 
have not yet been established. 
A constructive approach to the OMC would therefore be to regard it as a 
necessary first encounter in the integration process within a given policy area. 
Rather than calling for its abolition, a positive first step would therefore be to 
negatively delineate its areas of deployment through legal means, thus ensur-
ing that “colonization” of more developed policy areas is avoided. A constitu-
tional containment of the non-legal character of the OMC would establish 
firewalls between “pre-integrationist”, and therefore “pre-legal”, and inher-
ently political operations and policy areas where power politics has already 
been successfully restrained via legal instruments. Such restraints could be 
                                                 
87 Poul F. Kjaer: Formalization or De-Formalization through Governance? in: R. Nickel 
(Ed.): Conflict of Laws or Laws of Conflict. ARENA Report Series, Oslo, 2009 
forthcoming. 
88 And in fact ever since a system of European states emerged in the 17th century. See 
Norbert Elias: Die höfische Gesellschaft (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Verlag, 
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achieved if the treaty basis of the EU limited the deployment of OMC proc-
esses to policy areas where the Union possesses complementary (or suppor-
tive), as opposed to shared or exclusive competencies. This would not only 
serve as a safeguard against colonizing tendencies but would also ensure that 
the current tendency towards the application of OMC processes in policy areas 
where the EU does not have any competencies at all is avoided. Such a safe-
guard would therefore increase the probability that any expansion of the OMC 
is based on a conscious political decision to grant the EU the possibility of ini-
tiating such processes. 
A safeguard of this kind would of course merely amount to a negative limi-
tation of the OMC and not to a substantial juridification of the method. How-
ever, since the kind of power produced within the OMC processes is inherently 
difficult to curb through the deployment of legal instruments because of its 
fluid and non-institutionalized nature,89 the resulting kind of power is therefore 
difficult to frame through constitutional measures because constitutional lan-
guage remains tied to an “old-European” institutionalist perspective. As a con-
sequence, moves towards constitutionalization remain dependent on the exis-
tence of formalized institutions. A negative constitutional limitation would 
however limit the damage which the OMC already inflicts on fundamental 
elements of the European legal order such as the principle of IB. A principle, 
which, absent alternatives, remain a pivotal measure for the protection of the 
rule of law in the EU context. More generally, such a safeguard would more-
over ensure that the balance between law and politics and thus the balance be-
tween contingency and stability in the EU is maintained. 
The concept of the regulatory state contrasts with that of the OMC across 
virtually all dimensions. As Majone convincingly argues, for structural rea-
sons, there are specific societal functions which are not suitable for politization 
(e.g. central banking, competition policy and some forms of risk regulation). 
Indeed, independent regulatory institutions with discretionary power are today 
a common feature of most, if not all, developed democracies. Given that such 
functions have already been transferred to the EU system, a case can therefore 
be made for the establishment of truly independent regulatory agencies within 
narrowly defined policy areas. 
As already noted, many agencies have already been established. However, 
the majority are not concerned with regulatory issues as such but instead with, 
for example, monitoring and dissemination. Currently, there are few indica-
                                                 
89 Poul F. Kjaer: Three Forms of Governance and Three Forms of Power’, pp. 23-43 in: 
E. O. Eriksen/C. Joerges/F. Rödl (Eds.): Law, Democracy and Solidarity in a Post-
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tions that any of these agencies will develop into regulatory agencies with 
fully-fledged discretionary competencies in the foreseeable future. Indeed, a 
central reason for the failure of Majone’s policy proposal concerning the estab-
lishment of fully fledged regulatory agencies, is that the Community itself only 
possesses exclusive competencies in few and very narrowly defined policy ar-
eas. Hence, the range of policy areas where delegation of exclusive competen-
cies from the Community to agencies is possible remains very limited. Yet, as 
the unexpected emergence and evolution of Comitology and OMC illustrates, 
the future remains unknown. One possible way of avoiding the emergence of 
European agencies with full discretionary powers – where this lacks functional 
justification – is therefore to introduce a constitutional safeguard stressing that 
a complete transfer of discretionary competencies to regulatory agencies can 
only occur within policy areas under exclusive Community competence. Any 
move towards the establishment of full-blown regulatory agencies would 
therefore be conditioned by the prior consent of all MS, as well as the EP, to 
grant the Community exclusive powers in the relevant policy area. 
In between the OMC and the concept of the regulatory state, Comitology 
retains vibrancy. Comitology is strongest in areas of specific and complex 
regulation, where detailed harmonization is needed. But even if Comitology is 
an adequate frame for producing harmonization, its uncontrolled spread across 
policy areas since the 1960s embodies integration by stealth. To counter this 
development, a constitutional safeguard could be introduced limiting the de-
ployment of Comitology structures to policy areas falling under the CM and 
which are characterized by shared competencies. Such a limitation would 
moreover reflect the nature of Comitology as a partly MS and partly Commis-
sion dominated realm. 
The move towards a clear division of competences between the three modes 
of governance could moreover be complemented by the adoption of a sugges-
tion tabled several times by the Czech Republic during the two last rounds of 
treaty negotiations. The Czech Republic suggested that the ability of the Euro-
pean Council, acting under unanimity, to transfer policy areas from the cate-
gory of supportive competencies to the category of shared or exclusive compe-
tencies or shared competencies to the category of exclusive competencies 
without a treaty amendment should be a two-way street. This mechanism has 
however been developed as a one-way street in the CT (as well as in the Lis-
bon Reform Treaty); while it is possible for the Union to increase its compe-
tencies, devolution from the Union to the MS remains blocked. The functional 
need for integration however remains a contingent phenomenon insofar as it 
reflects the general level of societal interdependence, which in turn is depend-
ent on, for example, economic and technological developments. The need for 
European meta-norms, as well as the density of such norms, therefore changes 
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over time because the nature of the specific policy areas is constantly chang-
ing. This creates functional needs for the adaptation of policies and the institu-
tional structures which policy-making relies on through evolution or devolu-
tion of competencies. The ongoing evolution of the EU’s institutional and legal 
structures does not however reflect the perception that a Union characterized 
by adaptability rather than uniformity would be a far more viable construction. 
Instead of pursuing a constitutionalization of the already existing permanently 
changing constitution (Wandelverfassung), the EU remains committed to the 
continual reinforcement of the integrationist strait-jacket on the basis of the 
concept of an “ever closer Union”. 
9. Horizontal Constitutionalism II 
As regards the internal organization, it is important to keep the societal func-
tion of GS in mind. GS are structural couplings which serve as the means 
through which the EU ensures its embeddedness in society. Whereas the EU’s 
governing dimension can be understood in the narrow sense as an (embryonic) 
state because it consists of a political and a legal system coupled within a con-
stitutional framework, a broad perspective including both the governing and 
governance dimensions requires an understanding of the EU as a social con-
glomerate. This is necessary because the governance dimension, in contrast to 
the governing dimension, horizontally binds together a multiplicity of func-
tional systems and hence a multiplicity of forms of rationality. Different forms 
of rationality, such as economic, scientific and ecological, are of course also 
present within the vertical governing dimension. Within the governing dimen-
sion they however remain subordinate to and framed by legal, political and bu-
reaucratic forms of rationality. In contrast, the governance dimension is to a 
greater extent, characterized by horizontal (nebengeordnete) forms of coordi-
nation of different kinds of rationality. Hence, GS must be understood as re-
gimes characterized by multi-rationality which act as interfaces between dif-
ferent functional systems.90 This is also expressed in the partial dissolution of 
the public/private distinction within the governance dimension. Governance 
extends beyond public structures to include elements reproduced within, for 
example, the economic system, the scientific system, as well as ecological 
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(Wiesbaden, Vs Verlag, 2007). 
 30
forms of communication. This is because the EU’s political and bureaucratic 
structures are dependent on the kind of knowledge which can be derived from 
other systems and because the EU itself is faced with a need to stabilize its re-
lations with its environment. But GS are more than merely supportive meas-
ures for the governing dimension since they embody a systematic attempt 
which not only aims to directly stabilize relations between the non-legal and 
non-political spheres of society, but also to achieve the kind of co-ordination 
(Abstimmung) between functionally differentiated spheres such as economy, 
health and ecology, which is the primary societal contribution (Leistung) of 
politics in a radicalized modernity.91 
When compared with the period of classical modernity, GS can in other 
words, be understood as functional equivalents to corporatist structures. 
Whereas the diminishing phenomenon of corporatism relied on the distinction 
between employers and employees and hence indirectly on the stratified class 
structure of the industrial society, the emergence of GS are, on the other hand, 
a consequence of the move away from stratificatory and segmentary forms of 
differentiation towards the ever increasing relevance of functional differentia-
tion. With the functional equivalence of corporatism and governance in mind, 
it is not surprising that the demands for a democratization of European GS re-
sembles the calls for a democratization of the corporatist system through Ver-
bandsdemokratie which emerged during the period of classical modernity.92 
Such an objective was only possible however, because corporatist organiza-
tions are hierarchically ordered entities. They are “mini-states”, which have 
adopted the basic features of the hierarchical model of organization character-
izing state bureaucracies.93 In addition, corporatism only brings together two 
forms of rationality – the political and the economic – within the framework of 
economic constitutions. In contrast, GS are characterized by strong horizontal 
features and far more complex couplings of an entire range of rationalities, 
thereby making a transfer of the ideals of corporatist democracy to the context 
of GS impossible. 
                                                 
91 For the transformation of the substantial function of politics in the radicalized moder-
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As GS must be understood as highly dynamic autonomous structures, a 
“state-centered” perspective which only focuses on the governing dimension 
remains inadequate. Hence, achievement of a classic separation of functions 
within the governance dimension is not sufficient. Instead of the limited focus 
on the intersection between legal and political rationalities within the tradi-
tional doctrine of a separation of powers, it is necessary to develop a special 
variant. This would be directly oriented towards the separation of functions 
within the broader range of horizontal societal settings that are characterized 
by a multiplicity of forms of rationality. The principle of functional separation 
could, in other words, be transformed into a constitutional principle which 
should be applied to regulatory structures as such. Hence, not only the govern-
ing dimension, but also horizontal intermediate structures operating in between 
the public and the private spheres, should be subject to the constitutional prin-
ciple of functional separation. A move in this direction has already been made 
in the area of risk regulation through the introduction of the distinction be-
tween risk assessment, risk evaluation and risk management. However, a far 
more incisive move towards institutional separation, reflecting the reproduc-
tion of different forms of rationality within the functionally differentiated 
spheres of society, is required. Several of the existing GS already follows this 
logic. E.g. REACH, the EU system for the evaluation and authorization of 
chemicals operates with simultaneous but separate evaluation processes within 
the committee representing the environmental and health perspectives and the 
committee for socio-economic analysis. Within the REACH regime functional 
separation is moreover combined with a central complexity-reducing mecha-
nism that provides a solution to the problem of political overload, insofar as it 
reduces the problems which are of political relevance to those where real con-
flicts between functionally different spheres occur and moves the dossiers 
where convergence between societal actors has been achieved to the back-
ground, thereby allowing the political system to deal only with cases of major 
importance.94 
The OMC process on Research and Development (R&D) serves to illustrate 
what contribution functional separation can make. The OMC on R&D is char-
acterized by a bias in rationality since the process is framed by economic 
rather than scientific rationality. It is precisely to avoid such asymmetries that 
functional separation is needed. Hence, extending the earlier call for a purely 
negative delimitation of the OMC through law, one might consider whether 
functional separation allowing for the separate but simultaneous processing of 
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different rationalities can be introduced within the OMC. In the specific exam-
ple of the OMC within R&D, a “duplication” of the processes could be intro-
duced, as benchmarking and other evaluation exercises could be carried out by 
two separate structures. Respectively, these structures would provide evalua-
tions from a socio-economic and a scientific perspective, whilst remaining 
linked within a procedural framework which ensures coherency. Ideally this 
would provide a basis for informed political decision-making as it would allow 
the political system to make decisions reflecting economic as well as scientific 
perspectives, thereby enabling it to fulfill the function of ensuring a balance 
between rationalities. From this perspective, the merger of the three council 
configurations for internal market, industry and research into a single competi-
tiveness configuration which was undertaken to facilitate the OMC process in 
R&D was a move in the wrong direction. Indeed, the merger that took place 
clearly illustrates the de-differentiation consequences of the OMC in its present 
form and the dangers that lie in de-formalized forms of governance as well as 
the value of a formal legal framing of such processes.95 
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